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An assumption in prior research is that debt is homogeneous and provides inappro-
priate governance for R&D investments. We argue that debt is heterogeneous: although
transactional debt does indeed impose strict contractual constraints that provide
inappropriate governance for R&D investments, relational debt has very different
characteristics that provide more appropriate governance. Using a sample of Japanese
firms, we find that firms that align their debt structures with their R&D investments
perform better than those that are misaligned. Furthermore, firms tend to align their
debt structure with R&D investments, but only after deregulation permits relatively
free access to various types of debt.
Investments in R&D can help to build capabilities
that enhance competitive advantage (Franko,
1989), but they are subject to serious exchange haz-
ards that require strong governance safeguards (Hill
& Snell, 1988). According to transaction cost eco-
nomics, debt and equity are alternative governance
structures for safeguarding the capital invested in a
firm, with the suitability of each depending on the
type of investment made by the firm (Williamson,
1988). As investments in R&D generate intangible
assets that serve as poor collateral, lenders of debt
are reluctant to fund such investments (Kochhar,
1996; Long & Malitz, 1985; Williamson, 1988). Fur-
thermore, the rigidity of debt contracts can impair
the financial flexibility needed to pursue a sus-
tained program of R&D investment (O’Brien, 2003).
Thus, prior research has concluded that debt pro-
vides inappropriate governance safeguards for R&D
investments, and empirical tests have shown that
debt and R&D intensity are negatively associated
(Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; Long & Malitz, 1985;
Vincente-Lorente, 2001).
Debt is a critical source of funds for most firms,
accounting for over 90 percent of all new external
financing (Corbett & Jenkinson, 1997; Mayer, 1988).
Likewise, strategic investment in R&D is an impor-
tant use of funds for generating economic returns
(Franko, 1989). Thus, the governance implications
of debt for R&D investment have enormous practi-
cal significance for managerial decisions about how
best to finance strategic investments. We contend
that the conclusion that debt provides inappropri-
ate governance for R&D requires reevaluation, as it
rests on an assumption that debt is homogeneous.
In contrast, research on financial intermediation
(see Boot [2000] for a review) indicates critical dif-
ferences between private loans (i.e., “relational
debt”) and public securities (i.e., “transactional
debt”). We theorize that although the rigid contrac-
tual constraints of transactional debt are indeed
inappropriate for R&D investments, relational debt
is congruent with R&D investment for three rea-
sons. First, relational lenders help safeguard the
continuity of investment in R&D by helping de-
faulting firms to work through liquidity problems,
rather than automatically forcing them into bank-
ruptcy. Second, they closely monitor borrowers to
obtain the subjective information needed for such
active intervention. Finally, as relational debt is
private, it does not require public information dis-
closure, thus helping to limit appropriation of the
proprietary knowledge from R&D by competitors.
Using transaction cost economics, we first ex-
plain the differences between “market” and “hier-
archical” governance, the attributes of investments
that pose contractual hazards, and why hierarchy
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provides more appropriate governance for invest-
ments involving high contractual hazards (Wil-
liamson, 1991). We then describe the hazards asso-
ciated with R&D investments and why debt has
generally been regarded as providing inappropriate
governance (Williamson, 1988). Finally, we draw
on the financial intermediation literature to show
that debt is heterogeneous (Boot, 2000), comprising
two types with divergent implications for R&D in-
vestments. Analyzing a large sample of Japanese
firms over a 20-year period of deregulation, we find
that firms enhance their performance by aligning
their debt structures with their R&D investments.
Furthermore, firms tend to align their debt struc-
tures with R&D investments over time, but only
after deregulation permits relatively free access to
various types of debt.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Investments by transacting parties are subject to
hazard because “bounded rationality” makes it im-
possible to specify resolutions for all future contin-
gencies, and opportunism makes it difficult to rely
on promises to equitably resolve ex post disputes.
Thus, governance mechanisms are needed to help
transacting parties “fill gaps, correct errors, and
adapt more effectively to unanticipated distur-
bances” (Williamson, 1988: 570). According to Wil-
liamson (1991), markets and hierarchies are alter-
nate governance mechanisms that differ in three
critical attributes. The first of these attributes is
dispute resolution. Under market governance, par-
ties resolve disputes by strict adherence to contrac-
tual terms that are adjudicated by courts; under
hierarchy, court intervention is eschewed, and par-
ties resolve disputes internally by tempering ad-
ministrative fiat with forbearance. The second at-
tribute is adaptation. Under markets, parties rely on
high-powered incentives to facilitate spontaneous
adaptation; under hierarchies, they utilize admin-
istrative mechanisms to foster intentional adapta-
tion. The third attribute is compliance monitoring.
Under markets, relatively simple mechanisms are
used to evaluate objective contractual criteria; un-
der hierarchies, more elaborate monitoring of sub-
jective criteria is used.
The choice of governance mechanism is shaped
by the extent to which investments by transacting
parties are subject to three types of hazards: (1)
asset specificity, which is the extent to which in-
vestments lose value when redeployed to alternate
uses, (2) uncertainty about the states of nature and
the behavior of other parties, and (3) the appropri-
ability of the returns arising from a transaction.
When hazards are low, markets constitute the effi-
cient governance choice. When hazards are high,
however, transactions require stronger safeguards
to preserve the mutual gains that arise from main-
taining the continuity of exchange. Thus, although
hierarchies sacrifice the high-powered incentives
of markets and entail higher set-up and monitoring
costs, they provide stronger safeguards than mar-
kets and are therefore appropriate when hazards
are high.
Williamson’s Debt-Equity Framework
Firms obtain a generic asset (i.e., cash) from in-
vestors and in turn make strategic investments,
some of which may entail significant exchange haz-
ards. Williamson (1988) argued that debt and eq-
uity represent alternative governance mechanisms
for safeguarding this capital. Financiers require
safeguards to ensure that their investments provide
appropriate returns, and managers require safe-
guards to induce them to make “hazardous” invest-
ments. As our discussion above on the three at-
tributes of dispute resolution, adaptation, and
monitoring indicates, debt and equity can be
viewed as providing market and hierarchical gov-
ernance, respectively.
For dispute resolution, lenders rely on court ad-
judication (i.e., bankruptcy law) to enforce strict
adherence to contracts that specify interest rates,
terms of repayment, and liquidity covenants. Own-
ers of equity, by contrast, are not guaranteed any
returns contractually and must rely on the “forbear-
ance law” administered by boards of directors to
resolve disputes with managers. As for adaptation,
debt affords considerable autonomy to managers,
and relies on the high-powered incentives of the
threat of bankruptcy to induce spontaneous adap-
tation by managers. Equity owners, by contrast, rely
on the boards’ exercise of administrative authority
over managers to guide intentional adaptation. Fi-
nally, debt precludes the need for elaborate moni-
toring mechanisms, as objective data are sufficient
to verify conformance to payment and covenant
terms. By contrast, to protect their investment, eq-
uity owners use an elaborate monitoring mecha-
nism (a board of directors), which encompasses
subjective criteria.
Hazards Associated with R&D and the
Inappropriateness of Debt
Asset specificity. Investments in R&D create
knowledge-based intangible assets that have the
greatest value when utilized in conjunction with a
firm’s complementary assets (Helfat, 1994). Be-
cause these investments lose considerable value if
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bankruptcy forces redeployment outside the firm,
they do not serve as good collateral for lenders
(Long & Malitz, 1985). Furthermore, the necessity
of meeting payment terms can reduce financial
flexibility, and the possibility of unanticipated li-
quidity problems can induce managers to curtail
ongoing R&D programs (O’Brien, 2003), thereby
disrupting the continuity of R&D investment that is
vital for the accumulation and absorption of knowl-
edge (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).
Uncertainty. Evaluating the efficacy of R&D in-
vestments is difficult because of the considerable
time lag between investment and payoff (Laverty,
1996) and the many external factors and events that
may arise during the interim and can affect ulti-
mate payoffs (Hill & Snell, 1988). Evaluation crite-
ria also involve highly qualitative judgments, in-
cluding the probability of success, congruence with
current technologies, fit with other ongoing
projects, the strategic importance of a project to a
firm (Osawa & Murakami, 2002), and indirect or
spillover benefits (Oral, Kettani, & Lang, 1991).
This uncertainty results in acute hazards from po-
tential adverse selection (the borrowers most likely
to be credit risks are the ones most likely to seek
financing) and moral hazard (after borrowers obtain
financing they may take actions to shift risks onto
lenders). Overcoming these problems requires de-
tailed qualitative and subjective information. The
elaborate subjective monitoring by boards of direc-
tors (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990) provides own-
ers the strong safeguards required to resolve the
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard,
while simple objective monitoring by lenders
does not.
Appropriability. The returns to investments in
R&D are subject to weak appropriability, as the
leakage of information about a firm’s R&D programs
can lead to imitation by competitors (Teece, 1986).
Even legal safeguards such as patents are often
ineffective, as competitors are often able to engi-
neer around the patents (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson,
& Winter, 1987). Equity owners can monitor invest-
ments in R&D via the board of directors, a body that
can generally be entrusted to protect critical strate-
gic information from leakage. However, providing
assurance to lenders that the firm is making appro-
priate investments in R&Dwould require the public
disclosure of detailed data on the R&D projects,
which would necessarily weaken the appropriabil-
ity regime for the investments and erode managers’
motivation to make such investments (Bhatta-
charya & Chiesa, 1995).
Thus, notwithstanding the stronger incentives
and lower monitoring and administrative costs as-
sociated with debt, it fails to provide adequate safe-
guards against the exchange hazards posed by R&D.
Empirical evidence supports the contention that
firms that invest heavily in R&D eschew debt and
favor equity financing (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993;
O’Brien, 2003; Vincente-Lorente, 2001).
The Heterogeneity of Debt
Although transaction cost economics sheds con-
siderable light on the link between strategy and
capital structure, an important gap remains. So far,
we have followed previous work on this topic by
treating debt as homogeneous, as did Williamson
(1988). All debt contracts share several common
characteristics, such as contractually specified re-
payment terms and covenants, and the threat of
bankruptcy in the event of default. However, the
financial intermediation literature has shown that
debt is heterogeneous (we draw extensively from a
comprehensive review by Boot [2000]). Following
the terminology used in the theory of contracts
(Macneil, 1974; Rousseau, 1995), we classify debt
contracts into two types: transactional debt has
simple performance attributes and a fixed time pe-
riod; relational debt has extended duration and
complex performance attributes.
Bonds and commercial paper are issued in spe-
cific monetary denominations and sold to individ-
uals and institutions in arms’-length capital mar-
kets. For holders of these debt securities, the
performance attribute is simple: the direct returns
available from holding the securities constitute per-
formance. The period of contract duration is fixed
by the maturity of the securities issue and, in prac-
tice, is even shorter, as these securities can gener-
ally be readily traded in active secondary markets
(Boot, 2000). Bonds are classified as transactional
because they involve simple performance criteria
and a fixed time horizon. In contrast to bonds,
loans are private transactions between a firm and
financial intermediaries such as banks and insur-
ance companies. These transactions are typically
part of a long-term relationship wherein the lenders
generally “roll over” the loans and also provide
additional business services, such as letters of
credit, check clearance, and cash management. The
performance criteria employed by the lenders are
complex; the multiple sources of potential returns
and the indefinite duration of the lending relation-
ship must be considered. Loans are therefore con-
sidered relational debt. Using the three attributes of
governance mechanisms (i.e., dispute resolution,
adaptation, and monitoring), we explain why trans-
actional debt provides market governance similar
to what Williamson (1988) described, while rela-
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tional debt is more aptly characterized as hierarchi-
cal governance.
Dispute resolution. Transactional lenders con-
sider only the direct returns from debt, and they
thus adhere strictly to contract law by committing
to liquidate borrowers in the event of default. Re-
lational lenders, in contrast, consider the indefinite
duration of the multiple sources of revenue from
the borrowers, and thus they are motivated to em-
ploy forbearance and help struggling clients by re-
negotiating or relaxing loan terms and providing
additional funds (Boot, 2000). Exercising forbear-
ance may also help attract new clients by enhanc-
ing a bank’s reputation (Chemmanur & Fulghieri,
1994). Furthermore, debt renegotiation is feasible
for relational lenders because it requires agreement
from a relatively small number of concentrated
lenders (Gorton & Kahn, 2000). In contrast, trans-
actional lenders have neither the motivation to be
forbearing (they lack multiple business ties with
borrower firms), nor the ability (renegotiation is
infeasible because transactional debt is generally
diffusely held). Empirical evidence supports the
premise that relational lenders exercise forbear-
ance, as financially distressed firms that rely on
relational debt are more likely to both continue to
make strategic investments (Hoshi, Kashyap, &
Scharfstein, 1990) and to successfully restructure
and avoid bankruptcy (Gilson, John, & Lang, 1990).
Adaptation. As relational lenders often exercise
forbearance to work out problems, they cannot rely
on high-powered incentives (e.g., the threat of
bankruptcy) to induce borrowers to spontaneously
adapt to changing circumstances and must there-
fore employ administrative mechanisms for inten-
tional adaptation. Relational lenders gain adminis-
trative control in two ways. First, they often obtain
board representation (Kaplan & Minton, 1994). Sec-
ond, they combine tight covenants and selective
enforcement to obtain de facto administrative con-
trol. Relational debt contracts have more stringent
covenants than transactional debt (Smith &Warner,
1979). By selectively enforcing covenant violations
and threatening borrowers with default, relational
lenders can force renegotiation and thereby effec-
tively gain a measure of administrative control
(Berlin & Mester, 1992). Renegotiation after cove-
nant violation allows banks to actively intervene in
a firm’s operations by imposing demands, such as
the liquidation of specific projects and the redirec-
tion of strategic investments (Gorton & Kahn, 2000).
Monitoring. The exercise of forbearance and ad-
ministrative control requires access to detailed sub-
jective information. Banks accumulate proprietary
information on client firms through their “multiple
interactions with the same customer over time
across products” (Boot, 2000: 10). Also, banks often
obtain seats on client firms’ boards of directors
(Kaplan & Minton, 1994), thus bolstering the banks’
access to proprietary information. Relational lend-
ers are therefore better able to evaluate both firms’
ongoing projects and their financial positions. Fi-
nally, relational lenders not only have access to
more detailed and subjective information, but also
have the motivation to gather it. Monitoring entails
gathering specific information on clients, and rela-
tional lenders can amortize these sunk costs over
both extended time horizons and multiple business
relationships. In contrast, transactional debt tends
to be diffusely held, and thus lenders lack the scale
economies that would justify elaborate monitoring.
Accordingly, transactional lenders rely solely on
monitoring objective criteria that demonstrate con-
formance with debt terms.
In summary, relational and transactional debt
employ different forms of governance. Transac-
tional debt utilizes market governance; it relies on
rigid contractual terms, high-powered incentives
based on a credible threat of bankruptcy, and veri-
fying conformance by monitoring objective data.
These characteristics are essentially those offered
by Williamson (1988) to describe debt in general.
Relational debt, however, is quite different in that it
utilizes hierarchical governance; it relies on lend-
ers’ exercising forbearance in response to financial
shortfalls, employing administrative controls, and
monitoring subjective performance criteria. Fur-
thermore, these three attributes dovetail and rein-
force each other. For relational debt, the monitoring
of detailed subjective information makes it feasible
to exercise administrative control, and administra-
tive control in turn provides access to additional
subjective information. Similarly, relational lend-
ers do not display forbearance unless they have
both subjective information to evaluate a firm’s
long-term prospects and the administrative con-
trols necessary to influence investment patterns.
Whereas transactional lenders can verify compli-
ance by objective financial criteria and intervene
only in the event of default, relational lenders must
utilize elaborate (and therefore costly) administra-
tive and monitoring mechanisms. Furthermore, the
propensity for relational lenders to exercise for-
bearance instead of forcing liquidation attenuates
high-powered incentives. Whether or not these ad-
ditional costs of hierarchical governance are war-
ranted depends on the extent of contracting haz-
ards associated with investments in a firm.
Although some studies have explored differences
between relational and transactional debt (Ander-
son & Makhija, 1999; Kang & Stulz, 2000), prior
work has not addressed the governance implica-
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tions of such differences for R&D investments. Be-
low, we explain how relational debt appropriately
governs the high transaction hazards associated
with R&D, while transactional debt is inap-
propriate.
R&D and Type of Debt
Asset specificity. We have noted that the asset
specificity of R&D undermines both lender procliv-
ity to fund R&D and managerial incentives to invest
in R&D. Relational debt is better suited to governing
investments in R&D because, unlike transactional
debt, it allows lenders to respond to unexpected
disturbances with forbearance and help a firm work
though difficulties. Thus, the low liquidation value
of R&D investments is not as serious a concern for
relational lenders as they can be forbearing and
help the firm through liquidity problems, thus pre-
serving the value of R&D investments. Further-
more, the likelihood of forbearance helps protect
managerial incentives to maintain the continuity of
investment in R&D, which is critical to realizing the
benefits from an R&D program (Dierickx & Cool,
1989).
Uncertainty. Elaborate monitoring under rela-
tional debt reduces information asymmetries and
thus helps to alleviate the exchange hazards of
investments in R&D that arise from uncertainty.
Because banks have multiple business relation-
ships and those relationships are of indefinite du-
ration, banks generally monitor a client before a
loan is issued, while the loan is ongoing, and after
the loan is repaid (Aoki & Patrick, 1994), thereby
alleviating adverse selection and moral hazard
problems. Furthermore, relational lenders’ in-
depth knowledge, in conjunction with the de facto
administrative control that they gain over the client
firm’s investment activities, enables them to atten-
uate the moral hazard problem by potentially inter-
vening and redirecting strategic investments in re-
sponse to unforeseen contingencies.
Appropriability. As transactional debt is pur-
chased and traded in public markets, public disclo-
sure of information is needed. Relational debt,
however, is a private transaction between a firm
and a lender and does not require public disclo-
sure, thus helping safeguard proprietary informa-
tion about R&D from leakage. Therefore, relational
debt provides stronger appropriability safeguards
for investments in R&D (Bhattacharya & Chiesa,
1995).
Misalignment between debt structure and R&D
can impose unnecessary costs, distort incentives,
and impair firm performance. Firms with low R&D
intensity are appropriately governed by the high-
powered incentives and less invasive administra-
tive and monitoring mechanisms of transactional
debt. These firms do not need strong safeguards
and would incur unnecessary transaction costs by
utilizing relational debt. Conversely, R&D-inten-
sive firms incur higher exchange hazards and re-
quire stronger safeguards. Although relational debt
entails weaker performance incentives and higher
monitoring and administrative costs, it provides
the stronger governance safeguards necessary for
R&D-intensive firms. Furthermore, the rigidity of
transactional debt can disrupt R&D programs or
delay new-product launches when cash shortfalls
are experienced (O’Brien, 2003). Even during good
times, anticipating that transactional lenders will
be unlikely to forbear in the event of a downturn
can undermine managerial commitment to risky
long-term R&D projects. Additionally, keeping
transactional lenders abreast of strategic initiatives
would raise the risks of information leakage.
Prior research has demonstrated that misalign-
ment between governance and strategic invest-
ments impairs performance in numerous contexts,
such as the trucking industry (Nickerson & Silver-
man, 2003; Silverman, Nickerson, & Freeman,
1997), strategic alliances (Sampson, 2004), and in-
ternational entry modes (Brouthers, 2002). There-
fore, ceteris paribus, firms that deviate from the
prescription of our theoretical model should expe-
rience performance shortfalls.
Hypothesis 1. R&D intensity and the ratio of
relational debt to total debt interact positively
with respect to their impact on performance.
As the failure to align governance structures with
strategic investments leads to performance short-
falls, the pursuit of improved performance should
induce most managers to eventually learn from
their environment and their own actions and adopt
appropriate governance structures. Even if manag-
ers fail to learn, governance mistakes will eventu-
ally be “corrected” by either replacement of the
managers or the failure of inefficient firms (Wil-
liamson, 1985). Thus, competitive pressures
should generally drive firms to adopt appropriate
governance structures. The alignment of gover-
nance mechanisms with strategic investments pre-
dicted by transaction cost economics must, how-
ever, be qualified by an important practical
consideration. Government regulations can affect
access to various types of debt (Hoshi & Kashyap,
2001), and firms cannot adopt appropriate gover-
nance mechanisms if regulations constrain choice.
Alignment is possible only if regulations permit
firms to freely select their debt structures. Accord-
ingly, we predict that firms that are free to choose
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their debt structures will rely more heavily on re-
lational debt (versus transactional debt) as R&D
intensity increases.
Hypothesis 2. When firms can freely select
their debt structures, R&D intensity is posi-
tively associated with the ratio of relational
debt to total debt.
METHODS
Study Context
An empirical test of our theory requires a sample
of firms that has access to both relational and trans-
actional debt. Firms in many nations lack access to
both forms of debt. In the United States, the restric-
tions imposed by the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of
1933 severely curtailed the close bank-firm ties that
make relational banking feasible (Carosso, 1970).
Although relational banking is still common for
small firms, large public corporations in the United
States rely largely on transactional debt (Allen &
Gale, 2000). In contrast, relational debt from banks
is a critical source of external financing in most
other developed countries, such as Japan, Ger-
many, and France (Allen & Gale, 2000). Japan pro-
vided a particularly useful context for our study
because it has a longstanding tradition of relational
banking and, following deregulation in the 1980s
and 1990s, a readily accessible transactional debt
market. Furthermore, as Nickerson and Silverman
(2003) pointed out, deregulatory shocks provide a
useful testing context for contrasting alignment pat-
terns before deregulation (when choices are un-
available) and after deregulation (when firms have
access to alternate governance mechanisms).
Corporate Governance in Japan
As most of the published work on corporate gov-
ernance uses samples of U.S. corporations, we pro-
vide a brief overview of corporate governance in
Japan, with an emphasis on debt (for a comprehen-
sive treatment, see Hoshi and Kashyap [2001]). A
major difference from U.S. firms is that Japanese
firms tend to have close intercorporate ties and
place considerable emphasis on implicit contracts
founded on mutual trust (Abegglen & Stalk, 1985;
Gerlach, 1992). Stable lender ties, termed a “main
bank system,” are a distinguishing feature of Japa-
nese corporate governance (Aoki and Patrick [1994]
provides a comprehensive overview). Most firms
borrow from multiple banks but maintain a lending
relationship with a main bank, and most banks
operate as a main bank for at least some companies.
In a risk-diversifying reciprocal arrangement, the
main bank serves as the lead monitor of a de facto
syndicate of other banks that are subordinate lend-
ers. For other clients, this bank will likely be a
subordinate lender and part of a syndicate that
delegates monitoring to another main bank. Firms
maintain settlement and payment accounts with
main banks, and monitoring such accounts pro-
vides banks with subjective knowledge about firms’
operational situations. Banks also often provide
their clients valuable services related to mergers,
acquisitions, divestitures, and strategic alliances.
Senior bank employees commonly join the boards
of firms, providing banks both information and in-
fluence. When a firm defaults, its main bank takes
the lead in organizing a rescue.
As Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) explained, Japa-
nese capital markets were historically highly regu-
lated, and firms relied almost exclusively on rela-
tional lenders for debt. Then, in 1979, a long period
of gradual deregulation began, culminating in 1996,
when all bond issuing criteria were abolished.
Some of the important events in the deregulation
process were the clarification of overseas issuance
criteria in 1982 and the significant easing of issu-
ance criteria that occurred in the mid 1980s, in
1990, and again in 1992. As panel A of Figure 1
illustrates, our data show that transactional debt
accounted for less than 10 percent of all debt for the
average firm until 1982, when it suddenly began to
climb sharply to a peak of near 40 percent in the
early 1990s. Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates the dif-
fering patterns in transactional debt for small and
large firms (with the size distinction based on a
median split on total assets). Although transac-
tional debt for large firms peaked in 1989, it did not
peak for smaller firms until 1994. Overall, these
data suggest that very few firms could access trans-
actional debt before 1982 but that most firms could
readily access it following the 1992 easing of issu-
ance restrictions. Accordingly, in our empirical
analyses, we distinguish between early (1982–92)
and late (1993–2001) deregulatory periods, with
the later period corresponding to relatively free
access to the different types of debt.
Sample
Our sample began with all public Japanese firms
listed in the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP)
database between the years 1982 and 2002. As mar-
ket value information was missing for almost 90
percent of the observations for 2002, we dropped
that year from the analysis out of concerns over
possible bias. This left 2,111 firms and 33,714 firm-
year observations. We excluded firms in the highly
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regulated financial, public utilities, and communi-
cations sectors (about 900 observations). We also
dropped approximately 3,300 observations for
which the market value of equity was missing and
approximately 1,800 observations for which the
value of debt was zero. Finally, we deleted approx-
imately 2,600 observations that had a book value of
equity lower than 3 billion yen. These small firms
were denied access to transactional debt prior to
1990 and may have had limited access subse-
quently owing to the economies of scale in bond
issuance and accentuated information asymmetries
(see Anderson & Makhija, 1999). With occasional
missing data items, the final sample encompassed
1,853 firms and 24,320 firm-year observations. Data
for all variables were obtained from the PACAP
database, with the exception of data on R&D and
advertising expenses, which were obtained from
the Nikkei NEEDS database.
Variables
Dependent variables. Following prior research
(Anderson & Makhija, 1999; Hoshi, Kashyap, &
Scharfstein, 1993; Wu, Sercu, & Yao, 2001), we
considered all bank loans to be relational debt and
all bonds to be transactional debt. As Aoki and
Patrick (1994) noted, a main bank leads a de facto
lending syndicate and monitors firms on behalf of
all other lenders, so it is appropriate to treat all
bank loans as relational debt. The variable rela-
tional debt represents the sum of all bank loans
divided by total debt, where total debt is the sum of
all bank loans and all bonds outstanding. As it is
problematic for a dependent variable to be bounded
between 0 and 1, we transformed it by taking the
natural logarithm of relational debt divided by one
minus relational debt. Before the transformation,
values of 0 and 1 were replaced by 0.001 and 0.999,
FIGURE 1
Changes in Debt Structure over Time, 1980–2001a
a In panel A, the black line represents the ratio of transactional debt to total debt for the average firm in our sample, and the gray line
represents total leverage for the average firm. Panel B depicts changes in transactional debt/total debt for large firms (shaded line) versus
small firms (solid line). Firms above the yearly median for assets were classified as large; those below were classified as small.
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respectively. Results were qualitatively identical,
however, if we did not transform this variable or if
we used the arcsine transformation.
To serve as a proxy for a firm’s performance, we
used its market-to-book ratio. This measure, which
closely corresponds to Tobin’s Q (Chung & Pruitt,
1994), was appropriate because it incorporated not
just current performance but also expected future
performance. This measure was calculated as the
sum of total debt and the market value of equity
divided by total assets. Because this distribution
was highly skewed, we constructed the variable
performance by taking the natural log of the mar-
ket-to-book ratio. Results were similar if perfor-
mance was not logged.
Independent variables. Our main theoretical
variable of interest, R&D intensity, was calculated
as total research and development expenditures di-
vided by total assets. We also controlled for other
variables that may affect either the mix of debt or
performance. Total assetswas the natural log of the
book value of assets, and sales was total firm sales
(rescaled to trillions of yen). Sales was not logged
because we found that logging it did not improve
model fit, but would have created a multicollinear-
ity problem (as it was correlated at .93 with logged
assets). Analysis of variance inflation factors re-
vealed that multicollinearity was not a problem in
any of the models we report. Interest coverage was
the income from operations less depreciation
charges and divided by interest and discount
charges. Although this variable was extremely
skewed (and a poor predictor of relational debt), a
log transformation was inappropriate because of
both extreme positive and extreme negative values.
Instead, we transformed the variable by replacing it
with a percentile rank (scaled to be between 0 and
1) indicating each firm’s interest coverage relative
to all other firms.
The variable fixed assetswas defined as net fixed
assets divided by total assets. ROA, or return on
assets, was operating income divided by total as-
sets. Advertising intensity was total advertising ex-
penditures divided by total assets. Volatility as-
sessed the instability of a firm’s earnings and was
measured as the standard deviation of return on
assets over the previous five years. Although all
types of debt have both costs and benefits (see
Harris & Raviv, 1991), our focus was on whether
firm strategy influences the type of debt a firm
selects, controlling for the absolute amount of debt.
Hence, we controlled for overall firm leverage,
which was defined as total debt divided by firm
market value (the sum of total debt and the market
value of equity). Furthermore, in our performance
models, we also controlled for the interaction be-
tween R&D intensity and leverage (O’Brien, 2003).
Finally, in addition to the firm-level control vari-
ables described above, we also included a number
of industry-level control variables. For each indus-
try, we used the median values for the correspond-
ing firm-level variable measured in all firms for
which that industry was primary to measure indus-
try performance, industry relational debt, industry
leverage, industry ROA, and industry volatility.
Analysis
Conducting our analysis presented several criti-
cal methodological considerations. First, unob-
served heterogeneity was a concern because our
data contained multiple observations per firm. To
address this concern, we incorporated fixed firm
effects in all our models. Fixed effects were deemed
superior to random effects because our data encom-
passed virtually an entire population, rather than
random draws from a population, thus undermin-
ing a key assumption of random effects (Wool-
dridge, 2003: 473). Finally, a Hausman test indi-
cated that there was a significant (p  .01)
systematic difference in the coefficients from ran-
dom effects models versus fixed-effects models, in-
dicating that fixed-effects models were more
appropriate.
A second methodological consideration con-
cerned modeling the variable for relational debt. As
it may take time for firms to align their debt struc-
tures with their strategies, a dynamic panel data
model that accounted for slow or partial adjust-
ment in relational debt was required. Although in-
cluding the lagged dependent variable as a predic-
tor variable helps account for dynamic partial
adjustment of the dependent variable, it also intro-
duces bias into a model (see Nickell, 1981). Fortu-
nately, Bruno (2005) described a method of correct-
ing this bias in unbalanced dynamic panel data
models employing dummy variables for (firm)
fixed effects. Therefore, we employed Bruno’s
(2005) corrected least-squares dummy variable
(LSDVC) approach to model relational debt. Al-
though all three possible methods for correcting the
bias offered by Bruno yielded similar results, we
opted for the Blundell-Bond method because initial
tests indicated that relational debt was highly per-
sistent over time (see Bruno, 2004).
Finally, a third methodological consideration
concerned modeling the variable for performance.
As the market value of a firm can change rapidly in
response to new information, modeling perfor-
mance does not require a dynamic partial adjust-
ment model. However, our theory-based prediction
is that the variable R&D intensity impacts a firm’s
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choice between relational and transactional debt
and that the interaction between type of debt and
strategy impacts firm performance. Thus, in our
performance model, both relational debt and its
interaction with R&D intensity were endogenously
determined. If the performance models failed to
include every variable that influences both the en-
dogenous variables and the dependent variable,
then the endogenous variables would be correlated
with the error term and hence, with use of tradi-
tional ordinary least squares methods we would
suffer from omitted variables bias. We employed
two-stage instrumental variables (IV) regression
methods to eliminate this bias, by first regressing
the endogenous variables on all the independent
variables and then using predicted values of the
endogenous variables in lieu of the observed values
in the second stage, when performance was re-
gressed on the predictor variables.
Before performing IV regressions, one must iden-
tify variables that can serve as valid instruments for
the endogenous variables. These instruments are
used, along with all the other variables in the per-
formance equation, to produce predicted values for
the endogenous variables. However, to avoid per-
fect collinearity, these instruments must be ex-
cluded from the performance equation. Thus, these
variables needed to be strongly related to the en-
dogenous variables but weakly related to perfor-
mance. Although two instruments would consti-
tute a just-identified model (given two endogenous
variables), we used an overidentified model so that
we could conduct a test of overidentifying restric-
tions (see Wooldridge, 2003: Ch. 15). This test
allowed us to verify both that the instrumental vari-
ables were correctly excluded from the perfor-
mance equation and that they were uncorrelated
with the error term in the performance equation
(i.e., they are exogenous, meeting a critical assump-
tion of IV regressions). Exploratory regressions in-
dicated that industry relational debt and the lag of
relational debt might serve as valid instruments,
and we created a third instrument by interacting
industry relational debt with R&D intensity. Al-
though serial correlation can be a concern when
using the lag of an endogenous variable as an in-
strument, the overidentification tests helped con-
firm that the theoretically predetermined lag of re-
lational was indeed exogenous (however, creating
an instrument by interacting the lag of relational
debt with R&D intensity would have created an
endogeneity problem).
After determining the variables that were to be
used as instrumental variables, and before proceed-
ing with the analysis, we sought to verify that rela-
tional debt was indeed endogenous in the perfor-
mance equation. Although IV regression methods
provide improved estimates of the effect of an en-
dogenous variable on a dependent variable, they
are also less efficient, as they tend to produce much
larger standard errors than OLS (Wooldridge, 2003:
Ch. 15). Thus, even if a variable is theoretically
endogenous, it is preferable not to model it as en-
dogenous unless tests indicate that endogeneity in-
duces a statistical problem. A Davidson-MacKin-
non test of exogeneity confirmed that relational
debt and its interaction with R&D intensity did
indeed jointly create a significant endogeneity
problem (F  28.4, p  .01). Similar tests indicated
that R&D intensity did not create an endogeneity
problem in any of the models reported.
Finally, it should be noted that analysis of Cook’s
D statistics on preliminary regressions suggested
that four outliers had a statistically significant im-
pact on the performance models, and thus they
were excluded from the analysis. Also, all models
included year fixed effects (not reported) in addi-
tion to the firm fixed effects. Table 1 gives descrip-
tive statistics for our sample.
RESULTS
Table 2 presents the results of tests of Hypothesis
1. Model 1 is a comparison model using standard
fixed effects, and models 2 through 4 utilize two-
stage IV regression analyses with firm fixed effects.
For models 2 through 4, the Sargan overidentifica-
tion test statistic was insignificant, confirming that
the instrumental variables were indeed exogenous
and correctly excluded from the performance equa-
tion. Furthermore, the test statistics (Fs) for the
first-stage regressions of these models (the unre-
ported models for which the predicted values for
the endogenous variables were estimated) were all
well above 80, indicating that the instruments
jointly served as good predictors of the endogenous
variables. Also, the Wald chi-square was highly
significant (p  .01) for models 2 through 4. Fi-
nally, it is worth noting that we do not report mul-
tiple squared correlation coefficients (R2s) because
this statistic has no natural interpretation in IV
regressions. Although IV methods yield better esti-
mates of the effect of an endogenous variable on a
dependent variable, all else being equal, overall
model goodness-of-fit is not a consideration and
may very well decline when a variable is treated as
endogenous (see Wooldridge, 2003: 494–495). Ac-
cordingly, it is also inappropriate to test whether
inclusion of an endogenous variable improves
overall model fit.
Model 1 of Table 2 suggests that relational debt
has a significant, negative (p  .01) main effect on
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performance, but the interaction with R&D inten-
sity has no impact. However, as described above,
we know that both relational debt and its interac-
tion with R&D intensity are endogenous and signif-
icantly biased in this model. Model 2 shows that
when endogeneity is properly accounted for, the
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statisticsa
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Performance 0.02 0.53
2. Relational debt 2.19 4.21 .20
3. Leverage 0.31 0.22 .47 .19
4. Total assets 11.33 1.25 .00 .34 .21
5. Fixed assets 0.26 0.15 .09 .00 .08 .04
6. Sales 0.26 1.05 .04 .06 .15 .45 .13
7. Coverage 0.51 0.29 .11 .22 .59 .11 .11 .12
8. ROA 0.04 0.04 .40 .09 .42 .06 .02 .06 .55
9. Volatility 0.02 0.01 .14 .06 .11 .20 .02 .10 .06 .01
10. Advertising intensity 0.01 0.03 .06 .06 .17 .01 .04 .02 .09 .11 .01
11. R&D 0.01 0.02 .18 .12 .19 .12 .07 .01 .15 .11 .07 .05
12. Industry performance 0.05 0.35 .67 .16 .40 .06 .11 .07 .02 .19 .11 .09 .11
13. Industry ROA 0.04 0.02 .37 .04 .26 .08 .04 .07 .02 .39 .01 .20 .04 .53
14. Industry volatility 0.01 0.01 .19 .06 .17 .13 .07 .10 .04 .01 .40 .06 .13 .28 .05
15. Industry leverage 0.30 0.13 .50 .17 .50 .14 .11 .07 .13 .18 .12 .14 .21 .73 .49 .31
16. Industry relational debt 0.80 0.17 .29 .28 .24 .03 .08 .05 .12 .00 .06 .02 .20 .44 .05 .14 .43
a n  24,320. All correlations with an absolute value greater than .02 are significant at .05.
TABLE 2
Results of Instrumental Variables Regression Analysis on Performancea
Variablesb Model 1: 1982–2001 Model 2: 1982–2001 Model 3: 1982–1992 Model 4: 1993–2001
Constant 0.38** (0.09) 0.46** (0.10) 0.30* (0.15) 0.17 (0.31)
Firm
Relational debt (i) 0.01** (0.00) 0.02** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 0.08** (0.01)
Leverage 0.66** (0.02) 0.66** (0.02) 1.13** (0.03) 0.70** (0.04)
Total assets 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.03)
Fixed assets 0.04 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.17** (0.05) 0.18* (0.09)
Sales 0.04** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.03 (0.02)
Coverage 0.28** (0.01) 0.26** (0.01) 0.17** (0.02) 0.24** (0.03)
ROA 3.63** (0.08) 3.59** (0.08) 2.09** (0.11) 3.60** (0.20)
Volatility 2.11** (0.16) 2.14** (0.17) 0.87** (0.21) 3.86** (0.47)
Advertising 1.22** (0.14) 1.34** (0.16) 1.54** (0.20) 1.35* (0.59)
R&D intensity 3.67** (0.30) 0.89 (0.51) 1.38 (0.78) 12.77** (2.48)
Industry
Performance 0.68** (0.02) 0.65** (0.02) 0.66** (0.02) 0.57** (0.06)
ROA 2.15** (0.22) 2.45** (0.24) 1.34** (0.30) 2.31** (0.66)
Volatility 1.92** (0.64) 3.36** (0.70) 2.94** (0.94) 5.10** (1.77)
Leverage 0.03 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 0.28** (0.06) 0.00 (0.10)
Interactions
Relational debt  R&D intensity (i) 0.02 (0.03) 1.80** (0.16) 1.18** (0.21) 6.43** (0.91)
Leverage  R&D intensity 13.26** (0.88) 12.33** (0.95) 7.57** (1.84) 9.19** (2.09)
n 24,320 24,320 12,056 12,264
Wald 2 37,605 28,557 9,683
Sargan’s test 0.80 3.18 0.03
a Values in parentheses are standard errors. All models include firm and year fixed effects (not reported).
b The notation “(i)” indicates that the variable was “instrumented” in models 2 through 6.
* p  .05
** p  .01
Two-tailed tests.
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interaction between these two variables is positive
and significant (p  .01), supporting Hypothesis 1.
This finding suggests that the governance provided
by relational debt becomes more appropriate as
R&D intensity increases. Models 3 and 4 further
support Hypothesis 1 by showing that the signifi-
cant, positive interaction (p .01) holds in both the
early (1982–92) and late (1993–2001) deregulatory
periods. Finally, in an unreported model, a variant
of the Chow test employing interactions with time
period dummies (Wooldridge, 2003: 431–432) re-
vealed that the joint influences of type of debt and
R&D intensity on performance were significantly
different (p .01) in the late and early deregulatory
periods.
Table 3 presents the results of the least squares
dummy variable corrected (LSDVC) regression
analyses that were used to test whether firms re-
sponded to deregulation by aligning debt structure
with their R&D intensity (Hypothesis 2). Model 1, a
dynamic random effects generalized least squares
(GLS) model presented for comparison purposes
only, suggests that R&D intensity has a significant,
positive influence (p  .01) on relational debt. Al-
though this effect remains significant in model 2, in
which we employed the LSDVC technique to cor-
rect for bias, the coefficient barely reached signifi-
cance at a less stringent level (p  .05). This result
is not particularly surprising, given that the full
sample window encompasses very different regu-
latory environments. Supporting Hypothesis 2, we
found that when we divided the sample into early
and late deregulatory periods, there was a strong,
significant, positive relationship (p  .01) between
R&D intensity and relational debt in the late de-
regulatory period, but not in the early period.
To assess the economic significance of our re-
sults, we used models 3 and 4 of Table 2 to produce
predicted values for firm performance and then
converted these values back to market-to-book ra-
tios. Figure 2 presents graphs of the interactive
equations. Panel A depicts the early deregulatory
period, and panel B depicts the late deregulatory
period. In each panel, R&D intensity is plotted
along the x-axis from the 10th to the 90th percen-
tile. The lines labeled “high relational” represent
firms at the 90th percentile of relational debt
(which roughly equates to complete reliance on
relational debt), and “low relational” indicates the
10th percentile (almost complete reliance on trans-
actional debt). In both periods, firms that relied
primarily on relational debt experienced strong,
positive returns to R&D investment, and firms that
relied primarily on transactional debt experienced
negative returns (although the economic impact
was stronger in the later period). Furthermore,
TABLE 3
Results of Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected Regression Analyses on Relational Debta
Variables
Model 1:
1982–2001
Model 2:
1982–2001
Model 3:
1982–1992
Model 4:
1993–2001
Firm
Lagged relational debt 0.87** (0.00) 0.79** (0.01) 0.74** (0.01) 0.80** (0.01)
Leverage 0.32** (0.09) 1.03** (0.13) 2.13** (0.27) 1.30** (0.19)
Total assets 0.18** (0.01) 0.63** (0.06) 0.91** (0.15) 0.54** (0.11)
Sales 0.03** (0.01) 0.16** (0.05) 0.08 (0.09) 0.16 (0.09)
Fixed assets 0.46** (0.09) 1.56** (0.21) 1.28 (0.67) 2.97** (0.34)
Coverage 0.85** (0.07) 0.72** (0.10) 1.60** (0.25) 0.23 (0.15)
ROA 1.14** (0.43) 1.25* (0.57) 0.68 (1.28) 0.24 (1.02)
Volatility 0.42 (0.88) 0.29 (1.46) 3.16 (2.16) 4.66* (1.84)
Advertising 0.02 (0.42) 0.65 (3.24) 8.17 (4.85) 4.14 (4.66)
R&D intensity 2.16** (0.76) 4.07* (2.00) 1.09 (4.60) 7.39** (2.88)
Industry
Performance 0.19* (0.08) 0.37** (0.13) 0.68** (0.25) 0.13 (0.28)
ROA 1.33 (1.38) 1.83 (1.82) 0.24 (2.46) 3.04 (2.68)
Volatility 5.08 (2.72) 0.27 (6.36) 4.56 (7.84) 8.79 (9.80)
Leverage 0.20 (0.16) 0.65** (0.25) 1.91** (0.61) 0.59 (0.47)
Relational debt 0.70** (0.10) 0.95** (0.16) 1.24** (0.30) 0.89** (0.23)
n 24,320 24,319 12,056 12,264
F – 882.13** 455** 341.11**
a Values in parentheses are standard errors. All models include year fixed effects (not reported). Models 2–4 include firm fixed effects
(not reported).
* p  .05
** p  .01
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firms favoring transactional debt appreciably “out-
performed” those favoring relational debt at low
levels of R&D intensity, while the converse was
true at high levels of R&D intensity. This graph
illustrates that the governance benefits of relational
debt can exceed the costs incurred as firm-specific
investments in R&D increase.
DISCUSSION
Using transaction cost economics, we developed
and tested a causal model to explain why debt
structure must align with R&D intensity, and the
performance implications of misalignment. Ana-
lyzing a large sample of Japanese firms over 20
years of deregulation, we found support for our two
hypotheses: (1) R&D-intensive firms that relied
more heavily on relational debt outperformed those
that relied more heavily on transactional debt, con-
firming that aligning debt structure with R&D con-
fers performance advantages and (2) R&D intensity
was associated with higher ratios of relational debt
to total debt during the later phase of deregulation,
suggesting that firms generally aligned their debt
mix with their strategic investments once they were
permitted relatively unrestricted access to the var-
ious types of debt.
In previous work exploring the relationship be-
tween R&D and capital structure, researchers have
only distinguished between debt and equity, im-
FIGURE 2
Performance Implications of the Interaction between Type of Debt and R&D Intensitya
a In each panel, the x-axis plots R&D intensity from the 10th to the 90th percentile, and the y-axis gives predicted performance. “High
relational” and “low relational” respectively represent firms at the 90th and 10th percentiles of relational debt. All other variables were
held constant at their means.
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plicitly assuming that debt is a relatively simple
and homogeneous financial instrument. Our study
challenges the accepted view by drawing on the
financial intermediation literature to show that
debt is a heterogeneous construct with divergent
implications for R&D. Although some forms of debt
conform to the arm’s-length relationship described
by Williamson (1988), other forms entail close ties
and complex multifaceted relationships. By apply-
ing the core tenets of transaction cost economics
to this elaborated description of debt, we reached
the counterintuitive conclusion that the two forms
of debt are not just subtly different, but are ac-
tually polar opposites in terms of their governance
properties with respect to R&D investments. Trans-
actional debt relies on market governance and
cannot provide the strong exchange safeguards
that investments in R&D require. Relational debt,
however, provides the hierarchical governance
that is necessary to align the interests and incen-
tives of investors and the managers of R&D-inten-
sive firms.
The heterogeneity of debt has strong practical
implications for the managers of all firms, public
and private, who must make decisions about
sources of financing. Given its reliance on the as-
sumption that debt is homogeneous, prior research
would yield the incorrect conclusion that all firms
with the same aggregate debt level provide compa-
rable governance for R&D and that, hence, the
choice of debt type is irrelevant. Our research
shows, to the contrary, that failing to account for
debt heterogeneity can have an economically pro-
found impact on the returns to investments in R&D
and thus provides useful guidance on the impor-
tance of a firm’s selecting the right type of debt: the
type that best aligns with the firm’s strategic
investments.
Theories are often influenced by the context most
familiar to the theorist. As most large U.S. corpora-
tions tend to rely largely on transactional debt
(Allen & Gale, 2000; Davis & Mizruchi, 1999), it is
understandable why Williamson (1988) treated all
debt as transactional. Likewise, Jensen (1986), in
his argument that the governance properties of debt
can reduce the agency costs of free cash flow, im-
plicitly assumed that all debt was transactional.
Prior empirical studies of the relationship between
debt and R&D (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; Kochhar,
1996; Simerly & Li, 2000; Vincente-Lorente, 2001)
also treated all debt as transactional. Although
treating all debt as transactional is not an unreason-
able generalization for U.S. corporations, theories
based on this simplification lack generalizability to
contexts where relational debt is commonly em-
ployed. These contexts include small firms within
the United States, firms in many of the other devel-
oped nations in the world (Allen & Gale, 2000), and
even a subset of major U.S. corporations that em-
ploy relational debt through ties with commercial
banks (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994). Our treatment of
the divergent governance implications of relational
and transactional debt yields a more broadly appli-
cable theoretical framework.
Studying firms over a period marked by regula-
tory changes provides insights into the dynamics of
the alignment of debt structure with R&D. As firms
within our sample lacked free choice over their
debt structures, it was not possible for them to align
debt structure with strategic investments until de-
regulation was fairly advanced. Although compet-
itive forces should induce governance alignment
once deregulation permits such choice, alignment
may not occur instantaneously for all firms. In fact,
our finding that alignment conferred performance
benefits even after deregulation actually suggests
that many firms remained misaligned. As Masten
(1993) pointed out, competitive advantage is al-
ways relative. If all firms made the correct gover-
nance choice, then making the correct choice
would not lead to a competitive advantage and
there would be no observable relationship between
governance and performance. Possible explana-
tions as to why misalignment persists include or-
ganizational inertia and adjustment costs (Nick-
erson & Silverman, 2003), bounded rationality
resulting in managerial mistakes (Masten, 1993),
and governance inseparability (Argyres & Liebes-
kind, 1999), whereby other firm activities require
governance choices that limit alignment of debt
structure with R&D. More research on the dynam-
ics of and constraints on governance alignment
could significantly advance both theory and
practice.
Also warranted would be more research devoted
to disentangling the divergent views on the gover-
nance role of Japanese banks. During the 1970s
and 1980s, a period when Japanese firms pros-
pered, the close ties between Japanese banks and
firms were lauded for providing superior gover-
nance (Abegglen & Stalk, 1985). During the 1990s,
however, the Japanese economy fared poorly, and
the governance provided by Japanese banks was
criticized for involving excessively close ties bor-
dering on cronyism (Boyer, 2000). Rather than at-
tempt blanket conclusions about whether relational
debt always provides superior or inferior gover-
nance, we followed prior research in recognizing
that most governance mechanisms likely have both
benefits and drawbacks (Finkelstein & D’Aveni,
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1994). Accordingly, we explored R&D investment
as a possible context in which the benefits out-
weigh the drawbacks. We found that relational
debt is superior to transactional debt for R&D in-
vestments and that misalignment of debt structure
with R&D investments hurts firm performance. We
have noted multiple reasons for misalignment,
such as regulatory constraints in the early stages
of deregulation and likely managerial mistakes in
later stages. Yet regardless of the root cause, mis-
alignment hurt firm performance in both time
periods.
Interestingly, it is possible that the free access to
debt following deregulation may have exacerbated
misalignment for some firms. As deregulation pro-
gressed throughout the 1980s, some of the most
creditworthy industrial firms paid down relational
debt and turned to less expensive transactional
debt. To replace lost business, banks began lending
extensively to firms that were pouring money into
generic assets like real estate during the bubble era
of the 1980s (Hoshi & Kashyap, 2001). Although
relational debt provides appropriate governance for
specific investments like R&D, it is inappropriate
for the governance of generic investments like real
estate, to which the tight budget constraints and
high-powered incentives of transactional debt are
better suited. Consequently, when the economic
bubble burst, these firms were unable to repay and
saddled banks with bad debt. A report by Japan’s
Cabinet Office (2001) confirmed that less than 10
percent of the bad debts of banks during this crisis
was in manufacturing industries (where assets tend
to be more specific), while over 54 percent was in
firms in the retail sector (which invested heavily in
generic assets).
Several limitations of our study warranting fur-
ther investigation remain. First, our study relied on
archival measures of relational and transactional
debt. Qualitative research on the extent to which
banks exercise hierarchical governance should
help provide finer-grained understanding of the
implications for R&D investments. Second, al-
though Japan was an appropriate setting for our
study, debt regulations and bank relationships are
somewhat idiosyncratic in every country. Repli-
cation of our study would better establish the ex-
tent to which our transaction cost economics ar-
guments apply to other national contexts. Third,
we followed prior research in treating R&D in-
vestments as homogeneous. However, research has
pointed out that strategic investments can be het-
erogeneous, differing in the extent to which they
are directed toward the exploration of new pos-
sibilities versus the exploitation of known certain-
ties (March, 1991). Further research could clarify
whether relational debt is equally beneficial for
both forms of R&D. Fourth, we studied large firms
that had access to bond markets. Although small
firms often lack such access, they do vary in the
extent to which they forge strong bank relation-
ships. Investigating the implications of this varia-
tion for strategic investments would also be worth-
while. Finally, although we have advanced the
literature by distinguishing between loan debt and
bond debt, it is possible there are also important
differences within loans and within bonds. For
example, institutional investors with conflicting
goals often hold bonds (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, &
Grossman, 2002), suggesting that further disaggre-
gation may yield benefits.
Just as further disaggregating debt might prove
enlightening, disaggregating equity owners might
also provide further insights. Thus, like lenders of
debt, owners of equity could be classified as trans-
actional or relational on the basis of their use of
either simple or complex performance criteria and
either short or long time horizons. For example, Lee
and O’Neill (2003), taking a stewardship perspec-
tive, argued that stable long-term owners of Japa-
nese firms constitute “patient capital” that helps
foster a long-term view of investments. A transac-
tion cost economics perspective can complement
the stewardship view by explaining the causal
mechanism whereby patient (relational) owners
provide the safeguards that help foster managerial
stewardship with regard to R&D investments. Sim-
ilarly, David, Yoshikawa, Chari, and Rasheed
(2006) found that foreign owners, who tend to be
more transient or short-term, induce Japanese firms
to cut R&D. If transient owners can be characterized
as transactional, then a transaction cost economics
perspective can help to explain why the market
governance provided by transactional ownership
tends to reduce specific investments such as R&D.
Furthermore, the distinction between relational
and transactional owners is relevant not only for
Japanese firms, but also for U.S. firms. Several stud-
ies have explored the implications of ownership
structure for strategic investments such as R&D in
U.S. firms. Large block ownership (Hill & Snell,
1988), long-term pension fund ownership (Hoskis-
son et al., 2002), and activism (David, Hitt, & Gim-
eno, 2001) have all been found to favor R&D. Con-
versely, transient (as opposed to dedicated)
institutional owners curtail R&D investments when
faced with earnings shortfall (Bushee, 1998). These
studies suggest that there is considerable promise
in exploring the extent to which different types of
owners can be classified as relational versus trans-
actional, and the implications of such ownership
for strategic investments such as R&D.
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